Thinking Beyond the Original Bargain: Post Ratification Constitution Making and the Case of Iraq by Hamoudi, Haider Ala
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2110943
 
 
 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
Working Paper No. 2012-26 
September 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thinking Beyond the Original Bargain: Post Ratification 
Constitution Making and the Case of Iraq 
 
 
 
 
Haider Ala Hamoudi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
3900 Forbes Avenue 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260-6900 
 
www.law.pitt.edu 
412.624.1055 
E-mail: hamoudi@pitt.edu 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the  
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2110943 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2110943
1 
 
Thinking Beyond the Original Bargain: Post Ratification 
Constitution Making and the Case of Iraq 
Haider Ala Hamoudi 
In his arresting, recent book Constitutional Theocracy, Ran Hirschl describes some 
of the remarkable similarities that exist as between constitutional law and 
religious law.  Among other things, both rely on a sacred text of sorts that serves 
as an apolitical symbol for the nation, a founding document that grows 
increasingly difficult to amend over time and whose interpretation is contested 
and continually evolving.
1
  Others have made similar observations with particular 
reference to the U.S. Constitution.  To take but a few examples, George Fletcher 
describes the U.S. Constitution as a “nearly sacred” text,
2
 Daniel Lazar indicates it 
is as central to American political culture as the New Testament was to medieval 
Europe,
3
 and Sanford Levinson, reciting these familiar arguments, dedicates an 
entire book to exploring the implications of permitting a legal document to serve 
as a “constituent agent” of national identity.
4
  At the very least, even if one might 
hesitate to compare constitution to Qur’an, it might fairly be described as 
common, perhaps even uncontroversial, to regard it as having some sort of 
transcendental quality.  Put more concretely, a constitution must be understood 
to serve in some fashion as “constituent agent” of identity, a symbol of the 
nation, rather than merely a piece of legislation, albeit one supreme to other 
forms of law. 
This short paper describes some of the implications of understanding the 
constitution in such a fashion.  Some of the benefits of a “civic religion” founded 
on constitutional fidelity might be obvious. Surely, near universal faith in the civic 
religion helps to ensure national cohesion and avoid resort to violence to further 
the aims of political competition, for example.   
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Yet in a polity where a new Constitution must be written, such notions surely 
raise the stakes considerably.  It is one thing for disparate interest groups and 
political competitors to come together to enact an ordinary piece of legislation.  It 
is quite another to draft the nation’s premier symbol, the document that will 
serve as agent for identity, fidelity to which is the yardstick that measures good 
citizenship.  In such circumstances, even proposed provisions of fleeting legal 
importance become exceedingly controversial, almost existentially so.  
Thus, for example, it is hard to believe that reference to Europe’s Christian 
heritage in the preamble of the 2003 Constitutional Treaty of the European 
Union, as demanded by the Catholic Church, would have had any legal effect.
5
  
Yet when the document is understood to serve as symbol to European identity, 
the notion of a reference to Christianity is, to the secularist and the non-Christian 
alike, deeply offensive.  It is not reasonable to expect a person to adhere to a civic 
religion that explicitly calls upon religious and historical traditions which such a 
person categorically rejects. 
This problem is exacerbated in societies that are deeply divided, where political 
authority is seriously contested across severe identitarian divides, and where 
competing identitarian communities have broadly different visions of the ideal 
state.  Merely devising a constitutional formula that involves some modality of 
power sharing is hardly enough.   For if one identitarian community, let us call 
them the Catalans, seeks a broadly federal state with deep devolution of 
authority from center to federal region, and if another identitarian community, let 
us call them the Castilians, seeks a far more centralized form of state order, then 
the question is not merely how to divide power among Castilians and Catalans, 
but also how to delineate the respective sovereignties of center and region.  Or 
we might assume one identitarian community, let us call them the Copts, which 
seeks a highly secular state and another identitarian community, less us call them 
the Brothers, which wishes for a particular religion to be enshrined as the state’s 
faith, and for the state’s laws to derive from that religion’s legal and ethical code. 
Again, power sharing as between Copt and Brother may be important, but so will 
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be the extent to which any particular religion deserves constitutional recognition, 
and if so, how much.  And all of this, I must reemphasize, must be included in a 
single Constitution which must command each community’s respect, and earn its 
fidelity as the source of civic religion.   
Iraq presents a particularly pathological version of this sort of state with 
identitarian communities divided not only over the means by which to share 
power, but also by disparate and incompatible versions of state order.  There are 
the Kurds, a relatively secular identitarian community, an ethnic group persecuted 
throughout the entirety of Iraq’s history but suffering particularly acutely during 
the latter stages of Ba’ath rule.
6
  To describe them as suspicious of Baghdad and 
its intentions is to understate the matter considerably.  In an ideal world, the 
Kurds would prefer total independence from the state of Iraq, which has proved 
something of a genocidal catastrophe for them.
7
 But given that circumstances do 
not favor such a dissolution, the Kurdish leadership was willing to take as extreme 
a form of autonomy as it might be able to muster.
8
   
Then there are the Shi’a, Iraq’s majority community who until 2003 had never 
ruled Iraq, nor been represented in any remotely proportional fashion in the 
higher echelons of Iraqi society, from the officer corps to the political classes.
9
   
The Shi’a are overwhelmingly (though of course not universally) anti-secular, 
revering a clerical establishment and looking to it for spiritual and temporal 
guidance.
10
  They might not quite expect or desire the clerics to rule the state, 
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Iraq’s Shi’a understanding well the disaster that befell Iran upon attempting such 
an experiment, but they certainly do expect them to guide it, and the Shi’a 
leadership did negotiate with some fervor to secure for clerics a formal role in 
constraining state activity that violates core religious precepts.
11
 
Finally, the Sunnis are Iraq’s historic ruling community. They formed the core of 
every regime in Iraq, each of which, at least since the 1958 revolution, was to one 
extent or another deeply nationalist. At times, this nationalism was pan-Arab, as 
with the Ba’ath, while at other times more uniquely Iraqi, as was the case with 
Abdul Kareem Qasim, who led the revolution against the monarchy.
12
  The parties 
representing the nation’s Sunnis were fiercely nationalist, and firmly believing, as 
many nationalist groups the world over, that particularist affiliations, be they to a 
Shi’i clerical hierarchy or to Kurdish ethnicity, pose an existential threat to state 
unity.
13
  As such, they favored a centralist state and the fostering of a broad, 
single national identity, as they had throughout Iraq’s history.   
Three groups, three projections of state order.  Two are particularist, one deeply 
nationalist.  One is broadly secular, another fiercely religious.  One historically 
ruled the state and was therefore committed to maintaining not precisely a fallen 
dictatorship, but the mechanisms and means of state organization and 
bureaucracy.  The two others suffered grievously under previous regimes and 
sought broad removal and replacement of the state’s functionaries.  How would 
all of this fit into a single document that was supposed to then serve as the core 
of the nation’s civic religion, the basis of its national identity? 
The drafting solution: Embrace ambiguity.  Leave gaps.  Include contradictory 
provisions.  In short, draft badly to draft well.  Specifically, this is a process 
referred to by Hannah Lerner as “incremental constitution making,” where the 
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original bargain leaves much to be determined post-ratification.
14
  There is little 
doubt that this was done in Iraq, though it is more often derided than extolled.
15
  
Yet ambiguousness has tended to work rather well.  It has, for example, enabled 
the Sunni population which once voted against the ratification of the constitution 
in large numbers to embrace it.  Its national leaders accuse the current Prime 
Minister of violating constitutional dictate through such controversial moves as 
calling for the arrest of the Sunni Vice President, seeking the removal of the Sunni 
Minister of Finance, and resisting power sharing arrangements.
16
  The 
Constitution, in other words, protects Sunni interests against a potential, incipient 
dictatorship.   This is hardly the only instance to which Sunni leaders have 
appealed to the Constitution as establishing the basic rules within which political 
competition should be constrained.
17
 In fact, the claim is made so often it is 
impossible to take seriously any suggestion that even a vestige of the former 
Sunni opposition to the Constitution remains.   
Yet Sunni support has not led to Shi’i or Kurdish denigration of that same 
Constitution. One single Constitution has become the document to which all 
pledge fealty.  This is not meant to suggest that divisions within Iraq are no longer 
serious, or lethal.  Any who expected Iraq’s deep identitarian conflicts to 
disappear through a constitutional process could only be characterized as 
hopelessly naïve.  It is to say that Iraq’s elected leaders have pledged to work 
                                                           
14
 HANNAH LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 12 (2011). 
15
 See, e.g., ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN Iraq 227 
(2009) (describing the Iraqi constitution as a “mediocre document full of holes. . . leaving some of the most 
fundamental constitutional questions for later majorities or qualified majorities to decide.”) 
16
 Ayad Allawi, Osama Nujaifi, Rafe el-Essawi, How To Save Iraq From Civil War, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2011); Maad 
Qayadh, Iraqiya: The End of the Crisis over Hashimi and Mutlaq is a Condition for the Success of any Discussions 
with the “Rule of Law”, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 9 (March 15, 2012). 
17
 To recite two examples, both by one of Iraq’s most beleaguered Sunnis, Vice President Hashimi is reported in 
May of 2010 to have “reiterated” the Iraqiya position that it be given the first opportunity to form the government, 
pursuant to constitutional mandate.
  
Interview on Radio Sawa, July 18, 2010.  Moreover, in November of 2009, Vice 
President Al-Hashimi used his constitutional veto power rather aggressively to oppose an election law.  His 
statements reflect amply his reliance on the Constitution:   
If the law is not amended by the parliament or the electoral commission by reconsidering the distribution of . . 
. seats, I will definitely use my constitutional right.   I will not allow the passage of a law that contradicts the 
Constitution and the principles of justice, regardless of the price to be paid. 
World Briefing, L.A. Times (Nov. 16, 2009) quoting interview with T. Hashimi and Al Hurra Satellite Television.    
 
6 
 
through mechanisms and arrangements established in a single foundational 
document, and that this is no meager achievement.    
To here, I have dealt largely in abstractions, and so concretization is warranted, to 
demonstrate how the Constitution’s ambiguities have worked, and where they 
have not.  Let us begin with a success, that involving the constitutionalization of 
Islam into the state apparatus.  While there were important disputes, too detailed 
to recount here, as between largely secular Kurds and largely Islamist Shi’a over 
the extent to which Islam could serve as a constitutional constraint on legislation, 
ultimately the drafters settled upon a formulation that prohibited the enactment 
of legislation that “contradicted the settled rulings of Islam.”
18
  The phrasing is 
necessarily ambiguous, deliberately stripped of the type of known religious 
terminology (references to consensus, for example, or fundamentals of Islam) 
that could provide better definition.  It was this deliberate attempt to be 
ambiguous that led to the final formulation being acceptable to all factions.   
More contentious was the institution responsible for determining the 
constitutionality of legislation alleged to be in violation of Islam’s “settled 
rulings.”  Islamist Shi’a considered it unimaginable that its own clerical authorities 
would not have considerable, if not dispositive, input into the matter.  Secularists 
much preferred state judges, with their largely bureaucratized training, their 
preferences for state institutions and mechanisms of lawmaking and their 
familiarity with law.  Endless discussions led to nothing by way of agreement, and 
the parties ultimately decided to defer the matter, suggesting that the institution 
that would ultimately serve as Constitutional Court would be established by 
supermajority legislation.
19
 
This deeply divisive area of dispute was therefore handled through two methods 
of incremental constitution making—the deferral of a problem for future 
resolution, and the liberal use of ambiguous text.  While easy to denigrate from 
an aesthetic perspective, it has worked remarkably well from a legal one.  No 
legislation creating a constitutional court has ever been enacted (unsurprising 
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given continuing divisions) and hence the current Federal Supreme Court, a 
thoroughly judicial institution with no clerical representation of any kind, 
continues to fill the role.
20
  Secularists for obvious reasons find this comforting, as 
they find comforting the Court’s reluctance to use Article 2 to void any legislation 
of any kind, much less dismantle the state’s secular foundations.  The Shi’a 
Islamists, once insecure given their historic persecution, have become more 
comfortable in power, as their plurality in the legislature helps to ensure that 
sufficient heed to Islam is paid.  As such, the differing sides are satisfied with the 
current arrangements. With all the divisions throughout the region in the post-
Arab spring that have appeared respecting the role of religion in the state, it is 
remarkable that of all of Iraq’s problems, this is not a significant one.   
Federalism provides a more nuanced picture.  Even the most ardent nationalists 
were aware of Kurdish passions for autonomy. They were similarly aware that 
there was no realistic way to assert meaningful national control over the Kurdish 
region, which had exercised de facto independence for over a decade before 
Saddam fell.  Hence the provisions of the Constitution respecting broad autonomy 
to “regions” were controversial only at the margins, insofar as they referred to 
Kurdistan.
21
 
Much more controversial was the extent to which Iraq’s existing provinces should 
enjoy the same autonomy.  To settle the divide as between federalists who 
wanted to expand such autonomy and centralists who wanted matters to remain 
as they were, the drafters fell upon a separate tool of incremental constitution 
making: contradiction.  Each side received a provision to its liking.  To the 
federalists, Article 115, suggesting that whenever a provincial law and a national 
law were in conflict, provincial law would control so long as the province had 
jurisdiction over the matter in the first place.  To the centralists, Article 122(2), 
which suggested that provinces should enjoy broad fiscal and administrative 
powers, but left the definition and organization of those powers to the national 
legislature.  Naturally, these hardly fit well, and yet again, it has worked.  Perhaps 
because the provinces are woefully incapable of exercising meaningful legislative 
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capacity, perhaps because the provincial councils have other grievances and 
desires, the provinces have not set out to challenge national legislative authority 
on the basis of the Constitution.  Rather, they have sought to exercise powers 
granted to them under applicable legislation, including the power to remove 
Baghdad installed officials with whom they are dissatisfied.
22
 Praxis has thus 
settled what drafting negotiations could not.  As with Islam and the state, it took 
time, experience and an opportunity for the various groups to work together in a 
setting where the stakes were not quite so high to develop the arrangement.  But 
they have worked it out, and the Constitution served its purpose well by not 
forcing immediate resolution. 
Yet the arrangement on distribution of central and regional power is not perfect, 
and that is, ironically, because of an unusual rigidity.  The Constitution makes it 
relatively easy for a province to form a region, and once formed, the 
Constitution’s text makes it clear that the region in question enjoys the same 
near-independence that Kurdistan enjoys.  This is the possibility, framed once as a 
demand by a prominent Shi’i party, that led to broad Sunni disenchantment with 
the Constitution, disenchantment that only dissipated when it became clear that 
the Shi’a populace in its electoral choices was not terribly interested in 
regionalization.
23
  Ironically, it is outlying Sunni provinces now which have 
suggested, generally tentatively given the broad and deep nationalist 
predisposition of Sunni national leaders, that they should be permitted to form 
regions.
24
  This has, predictably, created more sectarian tension, as the Shi’a have 
developed centralist tendencies of their own.
25
 
Incrementalism and flexibility may have worked better.  Hence, less controversial 
would be a constitutional arrangement that, as per the Spanish model, created 
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various degrees of autonomy for various parts of Iraq in a manner that would be 
negotiated subsequent to constitutional ratification.  The Kurds would enjoy 
under any such arrangement immediate near self-rule, and other provinces would 
be left to work out suitable arrangements with Baghdad in the manner that best 
befitted them and the needs and desires of the competing constituencies of Iraq.  
Yet it was not to be, instead the provisions in the Iraq constitution respecting 
region formation are clear and specific, as are those concerning the jurisdiction of 
regions.  It is an irony, in the end, that the Constitution’s greatest weakness, one 
that is manageable currently but lurks as ever present threat, relates not to the 
fact that its terms are too ambiguous, but that they are too clear. The 
Constitution was not, in this single instance, drafted particularly wisely, but too 
well.   
